A licence is a promise, not a passport: What Asia can teach Malta about Bill 55
A Maltese gaming licence cannot override another country’s gambling laws and Asia’s experience shows why Bill 55 could risk Malta’s regulatory reputation.
By Kimi Yu, CEO, AskSpinner
Seen from Manila, Mumbai or Macau, Malta's gaming debate looks less like a quarrel between Valletta and Berlin and more like a question every regulator in Asia has already had to answer: can a licence issued in one country be exported into another country's market against that country's will?
This year the Court of Justice of the European Union gave a clear answer, and Malta should treat it as an opportunity rather than a threat.
On 16 April 2026, in Case C-440/23, FB v European Lotto and Betting and Deutsche Lotto- und Sportwetten, the Court ruled on a reference from Malta's own First Hall of the Civil Court. The defendants were two Malta-based companies holding licences from the Malta Gaming Authority, whose online slot and lottery-betting services were accessible in Germany. The Court held that Article 56 TFEU does not preclude a member state from prohibiting such games online, from treating contracts concluded in breach of that prohibition as void, or from allowing a consumer to sue for restitution of lost stakes. According to the Court's press release, a player's participation "despite the existence of a licence in another Member State" is not enough, on its own, to establish an abuse of rights.
A week later, on 23 April, Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C-683/24, Spielerschutz Sigma, a reference from the Commercial Court in Vienna about Article 56A of the Gaming Act, the provision introduced by Bill 55 in 2023 (Act XXI of 2023). Article 56A directs Maltese courts, on public-policy grounds, to refuse recognition or enforcement of certain foreign judgments against Maltese-licensed operators. The Advocate General proposed that the reference be declared inadmissible, because the Austrian dispute turns on whether a lawyer's advice was diligent. But he added that, if the Court took a different view, a provision of this kind would be contrary to the Brussels I bis Regulation. His opinion is not binding, and the Court's judgment is still pending.
The view from Asia
Why does this matter in Asia? Because Asia has lived through the other side of the same model.
For years the Philippines licensed offshore gaming operators, known as POGOs, to serve players outside the country. On 5 November 2024, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 74 banning POGOs, internet gaming licensees and other offshore gaming operations. The order's own recitals are blunt. It cites a Department of Finance study finding that the risks, "such as increased crime rates, social instability, and exploitation of vulnerable people", significantly outweighed the industry's benefits. It cites an Anti-Money Laundering Council report identifying POGOs as susceptible to money laundering and fraud. And it says the reputational risks deterred foreign investment and tourism.
Malta is not the Philippines, and the MGA is not PAGCOR's former offshore desk. But the lesson from Manila is structural. A licensing jurisdiction whose business case depends on serving markets that have said no ends up paying for that choice in reputation, and eventually in policy.
India offers a parallel lesson from the market side. In May, India's Supreme Court upheld Tamil Nadu and Karnataka laws banning online games played for stakes, and this month it dismissed the industry's review petitions, as AskSpinner reported. The principle is the same one Luxembourg affirmed in April. A state may decide what gambling is lawful on its own territory, and a licence from elsewhere does not override that decision.
Why AML credibility is the real asset
Asian supervisors also watch Malta for a second reason: anti-money-laundering credibility. The Financial Action Task Force placed Malta under increased monitoring in June 2021 and removed it in June 2022. In its statement, the FATF said the strategic deficiencies it had identified related to inaccurate company ownership information, sanctions on gatekeepers, and the pursuit of tax-based money-laundering cases. The MGA's own 2022 annual report notes that gaming supervision was not one of the areas the FATF singled out. That distinction matters. For an Asian supervisor assessing a Maltese licensee, the questions are simple. Is the ownership data accurate? Will the regulator share information? Will a court judgment be honoured?
Article 56A works against that third question. Whatever its drafters intended, the signal received abroad is that Maltese courts may be asked to shield licence-holders from judgments of fellow member states' courts. For regulators in Asia who are trying to persuade platforms to respect local prohibitions, that is an uncomfortable precedent to have to explain.
A better position for Malta
Malta has a strong argument to make, but it is not the one embedded in Bill 55. The stronger argument is that an MGA licence should signal the highest standard of compliance: verified ownership, robust player protection, and a firm commitment to serve only markets where the operator is legally entitled to operate.
Concretely, that means three things. First, Malta should prepare to amend Article 56A promptly if the Court of Justice confirms the Advocate General's reading, rather than waiting for further litigation. Second, the MGA should make geo-compliance with the laws of target markets an explicit licensing expectation, not merely a commercial risk for operators to price. Third, Malta should deepen information-sharing with Asian regulators and financial intelligence units.
Platforms must promote legally and compliantly in every market they touch. Malta built its reputation by being early to regulate online gambling. It can protect that reputation by being early to accept that a licence is a promise to regulators abroad, not a passport around them.
Kimi Yu is CEO of AskSpinner. Our news desk is editorially independent.
